Oblivion: Mitigating Privacy Leaks by Controlling the Discoverability of Online Information
June 19, 2015 Β· Declared Dead Β· π International Conference on Applied Cryptography and Network Security
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Authors
Milivoj Simeonovski, Fabian Bendun, Muhammad Rizwan Asghar, Michael Backes, Ninja Marnau, Peter Druschel
arXiv ID
1506.06033
Category
cs.CR: Cryptography & Security
Cross-listed
cs.CY,
cs.IR
Citations
9
Venue
International Conference on Applied Cryptography and Network Security
Last Checked
4 months ago
Abstract
Search engines are the prevalently used tools to collect information about individuals on the Internet. Search results typically comprise a variety of sources that contain personal information -- either intentionally released by the person herself, or unintentionally leaked or published by third parties, often with detrimental effects on the individual's privacy. To grant individuals the ability to regain control over their disseminated personal information, the European Court of Justice recently ruled that EU citizens have a right to be forgotten in the sense that indexing systems, must offer them technical means to request removal of links from search results that point to sources violating their data protection rights. As of now, these technical means consist of a web form that requires a user to manually identify all relevant links upfront and to insert them into the web form, followed by a manual evaluation by employees of the indexing system to assess if the request is eligible and lawful. We propose a universal framework Oblivion to support the automation of the right to be forgotten in a scalable, provable and privacy-preserving manner. First, Oblivion enables a user to automatically find and tag her disseminated personal information using natural language processing and image recognition techniques and file a request in a privacy-preserving manner. Second, Oblivion provides indexing systems with an automated and provable eligibility mechanism, asserting that the author of a request is indeed affected by an online resource. The automated ligibility proof ensures censorship-resistance so that only legitimately affected individuals can request the removal of corresponding links from search results. We have conducted comprehensive evaluations, showing that Oblivion is capable of handling 278 removal requests per second, and is hence suitable for large-scale deployment.
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