Objective Variables for Probabilistic Revenue Maximization in Second-Price Auctions with Reserve

June 24, 2015 ยท Declared Dead ยท ๐Ÿ› The Web Conference

๐Ÿ‘ป CAUSE OF DEATH: Ghosted
No code link whatsoever

"No code URL or promise found in abstract"

Evidence collected by the PWNC Scanner

Authors Maja R. Rudolph, Joseph G. Ellis, David M. Blei arXiv ID 1506.07504 Category stat.ML: Machine Learning (Stat) Cross-listed cs.AI, cs.GT, cs.LG, stat.AP Citations 20 Venue The Web Conference Last Checked 4 months ago
Abstract
Many online companies sell advertisement space in second-price auctions with reserve. In this paper, we develop a probabilistic method to learn a profitable strategy to set the reserve price. We use historical auction data with features to fit a predictor of the best reserve price. This problem is delicate - the structure of the auction is such that a reserve price set too high is much worse than a reserve price set too low. To address this we develop objective variables, a new framework for combining probabilistic modeling with optimal decision-making. Objective variables are "hallucinated observations" that transform the revenue maximization task into a regularized maximum likelihood estimation problem, which we solve with an EM algorithm. This framework enables a variety of prediction mechanisms to set the reserve price. As examples, we study objective variable methods with regression, kernelized regression, and neural networks on simulated and real data. Our methods outperform previous approaches both in terms of scalability and profit.
Community shame:
Not yet rated
Community Contributions

Found the code? Know the venue? Think something is wrong? Let us know!

๐Ÿ“œ Similar Papers

In the same crypt โ€” Machine Learning (Stat)

๐Ÿ”ฎ ๐Ÿ”ฎ The Ethereal

Layer Normalization

Jimmy Lei Ba, Jamie Ryan Kiros, Geoffrey E. Hinton

stat.ML ๐Ÿ› arXiv ๐Ÿ“š 12.0K cites 9 years ago

Died the same way โ€” ๐Ÿ‘ป Ghosted