Risk Mitigation for Dynamic State Estimation Against Cyber Attacks and Unknown Inputs

August 28, 2015 ยท Declared Dead ยท ๐Ÿ› IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid

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Authors Ahmad F. Taha, Junjian Qi, Jianhui Wang, Jitesh H. Panchal arXiv ID 1508.07246 Category eess.SY: Systems & Control (EE) Cross-listed cs.CR, math.OC Citations 106 Venue IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid Last Checked 2 months ago
Abstract
Phasor measurement units (PMUs) can be effectively utilized for the monitoring and control of the power grid. As the cyber-world becomes increasingly embedded into power grids, the risks of this inevitable evolution become serious. In this paper, we present a risk mitigation strategy, based on dynamic state estimation, to eliminate threat levels from the grid's unknown inputs and potential cyber-attacks. The strategy requires (a) the potentially incomplete knowledge of power system models and parameters and (b) real-time PMU measurements. First, we utilize a dynamic state estimator for higher order depictions of power system dynamics for simultaneous state and unknown inputs estimation. Second, estimates of cyber-attacks are obtained through an attack detection algorithm. Third, the estimation and detection components are seamlessly utilized in an optimization framework to determine the most impacted PMU measurements. Finally, a risk mitigation strategy is proposed to guarantee the elimination of threats from attacks, ensuring the observability of the power system through available, safe measurements. Case studies are included to validate the proposed approach. Insightful suggestions, extensions, and open problems are also posed.
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