Distributed Learning for Stochastic Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problems

July 29, 2016 ยท Declared Dead ยท ๐Ÿ› IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing

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Authors Chung-Kai Yu, Mihaela van der Schaar, Ali H. Sayed arXiv ID 1608.00039 Category cs.GT: Game Theory Cross-listed cs.DC Citations 96 Venue IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing Last Checked 2 months ago
Abstract
This work examines a stochastic formulation of the generalized Nash equilibrium problem (GNEP) where agents are subject to randomness in the environment of unknown statistical distribution. We focus on fully-distributed online learning by agents and employ penalized individual cost functions to deal with coupled constraints. Three stochastic gradient strategies are developed with constant step-sizes. We allow the agents to use heterogeneous step-sizes and show that the penalty solution is able to approach the Nash equilibrium in a stable manner within $O(ฮผ_\text{max})$, for small step-size value $ฮผ_\text{max}$ and sufficiently large penalty parameters. The operation of the algorithm is illustrated by considering the network Cournot competition problem.
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