Sustainable Incentives for Mobile Crowdsensing: Auctions, Lotteries, and Trust and Reputation Systems

January 01, 2017 ยท Declared Dead ยท ๐Ÿ› IEEE Communications Magazine

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Authors Tony T. Luo, Salil S. Kanhere, Jianwei Huang, Sajal K. Das, Fan Wu arXiv ID 1701.00248 Category cs.GT: Game Theory Cross-listed cs.HC, cs.SI Citations 107 Venue IEEE Communications Magazine Last Checked 1 month ago
Abstract
Proper incentive mechanisms are critical for mobile crowdsensing systems to motivate people to actively and persistently participate. This article provides an exposition of design principles of six incentive mechanisms, drawing special attention to the sustainability issue. We cover three primary classes of incentive mechanisms: auctions, lotteries, and trust and reputation systems, as well as three other frameworks of promising potential: bargaining games, contract theory, and market-driven mechanisms.
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