Online Learning of Optimal Bidding Strategy in Repeated Multi-Commodity Auctions

March 07, 2017 Β· Declared Dead Β· πŸ› Neural Information Processing Systems

πŸ‘» CAUSE OF DEATH: Ghosted
No code link whatsoever

"No code URL or promise found in abstract"

Evidence collected by the PWNC Scanner

Authors Sevi Baltaoglu, Lang Tong, Qing Zhao arXiv ID 1703.02567 Category cs.GT: Game Theory Cross-listed cs.LG Citations 7 Venue Neural Information Processing Systems Last Checked 4 months ago
Abstract
We study the online learning problem of a bidder who participates in repeated auctions. With the goal of maximizing his T-period payoff, the bidder determines the optimal allocation of his budget among his bids for $K$ goods at each period. As a bidding strategy, we propose a polynomial-time algorithm, inspired by the dynamic programming approach to the knapsack problem. The proposed algorithm, referred to as dynamic programming on discrete set (DPDS), achieves a regret order of $O(\sqrt{T\log{T}})$. By showing that the regret is lower bounded by $Ξ©(\sqrt{T})$ for any strategy, we conclude that DPDS is order optimal up to a $\sqrt{\log{T}}$ term. We evaluate the performance of DPDS empirically in the context of virtual trading in wholesale electricity markets by using historical data from the New York market. Empirical results show that DPDS consistently outperforms benchmark heuristic methods that are derived from machine learning and online learning approaches.
Community shame:
Not yet rated
Community Contributions

Found the code? Know the venue? Think something is wrong? Let us know!

πŸ“œ Similar Papers

In the same crypt β€” Game Theory

R.I.P. πŸ‘» Ghosted

Blockchain Mining Games

Aggelos Kiayias, Elias Koutsoupias, ... (+2 more)

cs.GT πŸ› EC πŸ“š 273 cites 9 years ago

Died the same way β€” πŸ‘» Ghosted