A survey of Hardware-based Control Flow Integrity (CFI)
June 22, 2017 ยท The Cartographer ยท ๐ arXiv.org
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"Title-pattern auto-detect: A survey of Hardware-based Control Flow Integrity (CFI)"
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Authors
Ruan de Clercq, Ingrid Verbauwhede
arXiv ID
1706.07257
Category
cs.CR: Cryptography & Security
Citations
66
Venue
arXiv.org
Last Checked
1 day ago
Abstract
CFI is a computer security technique that detects runtime attacks by monitoring a program's branching behavior. This work presents a detailed analysis of the security policies enforced by 21 recent hardware-based CFI architectures. The goal is to evaluate the security, limitations, hardware cost, performance, and practicality of using these policies. We show that many architectures are not suitable for widespread adoption, since they have practical issues, such as relying on accurate control flow model (which is difficult to obtain) or they implement policies which provide only limited security.
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