A survey of Hardware-based Control Flow Integrity (CFI)

June 22, 2017 ยท The Cartographer ยท ๐Ÿ› arXiv.org

๐Ÿ“š THE CARTOGRAPHER: The Cartographer
Survey/review paper โ€” maps the landscape rather than implementing a method.

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"Title-pattern auto-detect: A survey of Hardware-based Control Flow Integrity (CFI)"

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Authors Ruan de Clercq, Ingrid Verbauwhede arXiv ID 1706.07257 Category cs.CR: Cryptography & Security Citations 66 Venue arXiv.org Last Checked 1 day ago
Abstract
CFI is a computer security technique that detects runtime attacks by monitoring a program's branching behavior. This work presents a detailed analysis of the security policies enforced by 21 recent hardware-based CFI architectures. The goal is to evaluate the security, limitations, hardware cost, performance, and practicality of using these policies. We show that many architectures are not suitable for widespread adoption, since they have practical issues, such as relying on accurate control flow model (which is difficult to obtain) or they implement policies which provide only limited security.
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