The Power Allocation Game on A Network: A Paradox

February 11, 2018 Β· Declared Dead Β· πŸ› IEEE/CAA Journal of Automatica Sinica

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Authors Yuke Li, A. Stephen Morse arXiv ID 1802.03669 Category cs.GT: Game Theory Cross-listed cs.SI Citations 10 Venue IEEE/CAA Journal of Automatica Sinica Last Checked 3 months ago
Abstract
The well-known Braess paradox in congestion games states that adding an additional road to a transportation network may increase the total travel time, and consequently decrease the overall efficiency. Motivated by this, this paper presents a paradox in a similar spirit emerging from another distributed resource allocation game on networks, namely the power allocation game between countries developed in \cite{allocation}. The paradox is that by having additional friends may actually decrease a country's total welfare in equilibrium. Conditions for this paradox to occur as well as some price of anarchy results are also derived.
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