Blameworthiness in Strategic Games
September 14, 2018 Β· Declared Dead Β· π AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence
"No code URL or promise found in abstract"
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Authors
Pavel Naumov, Jia Tao
arXiv ID
1809.05485
Category
cs.AI: Artificial Intelligence
Cross-listed
cs.GT,
cs.LO,
cs.MA,
math.LO
Citations
20
Venue
AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Last Checked
4 months ago
Abstract
There are multiple notions of coalitional responsibility. The focus of this paper is on the blameworthiness defined through the principle of alternative possibilities: a coalition is blamable for a statement if the statement is true, but the coalition had a strategy to prevent it. The main technical result is a sound and complete bimodal logical system that describes properties of blameworthiness in one-shot games.
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