An AGI with Time-Inconsistent Preferences

June 23, 2019 Β· Declared Dead Β· πŸ› Delphi - Interdisciplinary Review of Emerging Technologies

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Authors James D. Miller, Roman Yampolskiy arXiv ID 1906.10536 Category cs.AI: Artificial Intelligence Citations 3 Venue Delphi - Interdisciplinary Review of Emerging Technologies Last Checked 4 months ago
Abstract
This paper reveals a trap for artificial general intelligence (AGI) theorists who use economists' standard method of discounting. This trap is implicitly and falsely assuming that a rational AGI would have time-consistent preferences. An agent with time-inconsistent preferences knows that its future self will disagree with its current self concerning intertemporal decision making. Such an agent cannot automatically trust its future self to carry out plans that its current self considers optimal.
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