An AGI with Time-Inconsistent Preferences
June 23, 2019 Β· Declared Dead Β· π Delphi - Interdisciplinary Review of Emerging Technologies
"No code URL or promise found in abstract"
Evidence collected by the PWNC Scanner
Authors
James D. Miller, Roman Yampolskiy
arXiv ID
1906.10536
Category
cs.AI: Artificial Intelligence
Citations
3
Venue
Delphi - Interdisciplinary Review of Emerging Technologies
Last Checked
4 months ago
Abstract
This paper reveals a trap for artificial general intelligence (AGI) theorists who use economists' standard method of discounting. This trap is implicitly and falsely assuming that a rational AGI would have time-consistent preferences. An agent with time-inconsistent preferences knows that its future self will disagree with its current self concerning intertemporal decision making. Such an agent cannot automatically trust its future self to carry out plans that its current self considers optimal.
Community Contributions
Found the code? Know the venue? Think something is wrong? Let us know!
π Similar Papers
In the same crypt β Artificial Intelligence
π
π
The Cartographer
R.I.P.
π»
Ghosted
Explanation in Artificial Intelligence: Insights from the Social Sciences
R.I.P.
π»
Ghosted
Federated Machine Learning: Concept and Applications
R.I.P.
π»
Ghosted
Counterfactual Explanations without Opening the Black Box: Automated Decisions and the GDPR
R.I.P.
π»
Ghosted
DeepAR: Probabilistic Forecasting with Autoregressive Recurrent Networks
R.I.P.
π»
Ghosted
Rainbow: Combining Improvements in Deep Reinforcement Learning
Died the same way β π» Ghosted
R.I.P.
π»
Ghosted
Federated Learning: Strategies for Improving Communication Efficiency
R.I.P.
π»
Ghosted
In-Datacenter Performance Analysis of a Tensor Processing Unit
R.I.P.
π»
Ghosted
Deep Convolutional Neural Networks for Computer-Aided Detection: CNN Architectures, Dataset Characteristics and Transfer Learning
R.I.P.
π»
Ghosted