An abstract semantics of speculative execution for reasoning about security vulnerabilities

Reasoning about correctness and security of software is increasingly difficult due to the complexity of modern microarchitectural features such as out-of-order execution. A class of security vulnerabilities termed Spectre that exploits side effects of speculative, out-of-order execution was announced in 2018 and has since drawn much attention. In this paper we formalise speculative execution and its side effects with the intention of allowing speculation to be reasoned about abstractly at the program level, limiting the exposure to processor-specific or low-level semantics. To this end we encode and expose speculative execution explicitly in the programming language, rather than solely in the operational semantics; as a result the effects of speculative execution are captured by redefining the meaning of a conditional statement, and introducing novel language constructs that model transient execution of an alternative branch. We add an abstract cache to the global state of the system, and derive some general refinement rules that expose cache side effects due to speculative loads. Underlying this extension is a semantic model that is based on instruction-level parallelism. The rules are encoded in a simulation tool, which we use to analyse an abstract specification of a Spectre attack and vulnerable code fragments.