Representing Pure Nash Equilibria in Argumentation

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Authors Bruno Yun, Srdjan Vesic, Nir Oren arXiv ID 2006.11020 Category cs.AI: Artificial Intelligence Cross-listed cs.GT Citations 4 Venue Argument Comput. Last Checked 4 months ago
Abstract
In this paper we describe an argumentation-based representation of normal form games, and demonstrate how argumentation can be used to compute pure strategy Nash equilibria. Our approach builds on Modgil's Extended Argumentation Frameworks. We demonstrate its correctness, prove several theoretical properties it satisfies, and outline how it can be used to explain why certain strategies are Nash equilibria to a non-expert human user.
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