Representing Pure Nash Equilibria in Argumentation
June 19, 2020 Β· Declared Dead Β· π Argument Comput.
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Authors
Bruno Yun, Srdjan Vesic, Nir Oren
arXiv ID
2006.11020
Category
cs.AI: Artificial Intelligence
Cross-listed
cs.GT
Citations
4
Venue
Argument Comput.
Last Checked
4 months ago
Abstract
In this paper we describe an argumentation-based representation of normal form games, and demonstrate how argumentation can be used to compute pure strategy Nash equilibria. Our approach builds on Modgil's Extended Argumentation Frameworks. We demonstrate its correctness, prove several theoretical properties it satisfies, and outline how it can be used to explain why certain strategies are Nash equilibria to a non-expert human user.
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