SALSA: Attacking Lattice Cryptography with Transformers
July 11, 2022 Β· Declared Dead Β· π IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive
"No code URL or promise found in abstract"
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Authors
Emily Wenger, Mingjie Chen, FranΓ§ois Charton, Kristin Lauter
arXiv ID
2207.04785
Category
cs.CR: Cryptography & Security
Cross-listed
cs.LG
Citations
50
Venue
IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive
Last Checked
2 months ago
Abstract
Currently deployed public-key cryptosystems will be vulnerable to attacks by full-scale quantum computers. Consequently, "quantum resistant" cryptosystems are in high demand, and lattice-based cryptosystems, based on a hard problem known as Learning With Errors (LWE), have emerged as strong contenders for standardization. In this work, we train transformers to perform modular arithmetic and combine half-trained models with statistical cryptanalysis techniques to propose SALSA: a machine learning attack on LWE-based cryptographic schemes. SALSA can fully recover secrets for small-to-mid size LWE instances with sparse binary secrets, and may scale to attack real-world LWE-based cryptosystems.
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