Selection and Ordering Policies for Hiring Pipelines via Linear Programming

October 08, 2022 Β· Declared Dead Β· πŸ› Operational Research

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Authors Boris Epstein, Will Ma arXiv ID 2210.04059 Category cs.DS: Data Structures & Algorithms Citations 7 Venue Operational Research Last Checked 4 months ago
Abstract
Motivated by hiring pipelines, we study three selection and ordering problems in which applicants for a finite set of positions must be interviewed or sent offers. There is a finite time budget for interviewing/sending offers, and every interview/offer is followed by a stochastic realization of discovering the applicant's quality or acceptance decision, leading to computationally challenging problems. In the first problem, we study sequential interviewing and show that a computationally tractable, non-adaptive policy that must make offers immediately after interviewing is near-optimal, assuming offers are always accepted. We further show how to use this policy as a subroutine for obtaining a PTAS. In the second problem, we assume that applicants have already been interviewed but only accept offers with some probability; we develop a computationally tractable policy that makes offers for the different positions in parallel, which can be used even if positions are heterogeneous, and is near-optimal relative to a policy that can make the same total number of offers one by one. In the third problem, we introduce a parsimonious model of overbooking where all offers must be sent simultaneously and a linear penalty is incurred for each acceptance beyond the number of positions; we provide nearly tight bounds on the performance of practically motivated value-ordered policies. All in all, our paper takes a unified approach to three different hiring problems, based on linear programming. Our results in the first two problems generalize and improve the existing guarantees due to Purohit et al. (2019) that were between 1/8 and 1/2 to new guarantees that are at least 1-1/e. We also numerically compare three different settings of making offers to candidates (sequentially, in parallel, or simultaneously), providing insight into when a firm should favor each one.
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