Enabling Efficient Attack Investigation via Human-in-the-Loop Security Analysis

November 10, 2022 Β· Declared Dead Β· πŸ› Proceedings of the VLDB Endowment

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Authors Saimon Amanuel Tsegai, Xinyu Yang, Haoyuan Liu, Peng Gao arXiv ID 2211.05403 Category cs.CR: Cryptography & Security Cross-listed cs.CL, cs.DB Citations 2 Venue Proceedings of the VLDB Endowment Last Checked 5 months ago
Abstract
System auditing is a vital technique for collecting system call events as system provenance and investigating complex multi-step attacks such as Advanced Persistent Threats. However, existing attack investigation methods struggle to uncover long attack sequences due to the massive volume of system provenance data and their inability to focus on attack-relevant parts. In this paper, we present Provexa, a defense system that enables human analysts to effectively analyze large-scale system provenance to reveal multi-step attack sequences. Provexa introduces an expressive domain-specific language, ProvQL, that offers essential primitives for various types of attack analyses (e.g., attack pattern search, attack dependency tracking) with user-defined constraints, enabling analysts to focus on attack-relevant parts and iteratively sift through the large provenance data. Moreover, Provexa provides an optimized execution engine for efficient language execution. Our extensive evaluations on a wide range of attack scenarios demonstrate the practical effectiveness of Provexa in facilitating timely attack investigation.
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