Understanding Users' Interaction with Login Notifications

December 14, 2022 Β· Declared Dead Β· πŸ› International Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems

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Authors Philipp Markert, Leona Lassak, Maximilian Golla, Markus DΓΌrmuth arXiv ID 2212.07316 Category cs.HC: Human-Computer Interaction Citations 8 Venue International Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems Last Checked 4 months ago
Abstract
Login notifications intend to inform users about sign-ins and help them protect their accounts from unauthorized access. Notifications are usually sent if a login deviates from previous ones, potentially indicating malicious activity. They contain information like the location, date, time, and device used to sign in. Users are challenged to verify whether they recognize the login (because it was them or someone they know) or to protect their account from unwanted access. In a user study, we explore users' comprehension, reactions, and expectations of login notifications. We utilize two treatments to measure users' behavior in response to notifications sent for a login they initiated or based on a malicious actor relying on statistical sign-in information. We find that users identify legitimate logins but need more support to halt malicious sign-ins. We discuss the identified problems and give recommendations for service providers to ensure usable and secure logins for everyone.
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