Measuring CDNs susceptible to Domain Fronting

October 27, 2023 Β· Declared Dead Β· πŸ› The Web Conference

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Authors Karthika Subramani, Roberto Perdisci, Pierros Skafidas arXiv ID 2310.17851 Category cs.CR: Cryptography & Security Cross-listed cs.NI Citations 4 Venue The Web Conference Last Checked 4 months ago
Abstract
Domain fronting is a network communication technique that involves leveraging (or abusing) content delivery networks (CDNs) to disguise the final destination of network packets by presenting them as if they were intended for a different domain than their actual endpoint. This technique can be used for both benign and malicious purposes, such as circumventing censorship or hiding malware-related communications from network security systems. Since domain fronting has been known for a few years, some popular CDN providers have implemented traffic filtering approaches to curb its use at their CDN infrastructure. However, it remains unclear to what extent domain fronting has been mitigated. To better understand whether domain fronting can still be effectively used, we propose a systematic approach to discover CDNs that are still prone to domain fronting. To this end, we leverage passive and active DNS traffic analysis to pinpoint domain names served by CDNs and build an automated tool that can be used to discover CDNs that allow domain fronting in their infrastructure. Our results reveal that domain fronting is feasible in 22 out of 30 CDNs that we tested, including some major CDN providers like Akamai and Fastly. This indicates that domain fronting remains widely available and can be easily abused for malicious purposes.
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