Budget Recycling Differential Privacy
March 18, 2024 Β· Declared Dead Β· π IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
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Authors
Bo Jiang, Jian Du, Sagar Sharma, Qiang Yan
arXiv ID
2403.11445
Category
cs.CR: Cryptography & Security
Cross-listed
cs.DS,
eess.SP
Citations
4
Venue
IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Last Checked
3 months ago
Abstract
Differential Privacy (DP) mechanisms usually {force} reduction in data utility by producing "out-of-bound" noisy results for a tight privacy budget. We introduce the Budget Recycling Differential Privacy (BR-DP) framework, designed to provide soft-bounded noisy outputs for a broad range of existing DP mechanisms. By "soft-bounded," we refer to the mechanism's ability to release most outputs within a predefined error boundary, thereby improving utility and maintaining privacy simultaneously. The core of BR-DP consists of two components: a DP kernel responsible for generating a noisy answer per iteration, and a recycler that probabilistically recycles/regenerates or releases the noisy answer. We delve into the privacy accounting of BR-DP, culminating in the development of a budgeting principle that optimally sub-allocates the available budget between the DP kernel and the recycler. Furthermore, we introduce algorithms for tight BR-DP accounting in composition scenarios, and our findings indicate that BR-DP achieves reduced privacy leakage post-composition compared to DP. Additionally, we explore the concept of privacy amplification via subsampling within the BR-DP framework and propose optimal sampling rates for BR-DP across various queries. We experiment with real data, and the results demonstrate BR-DP's effectiveness in lifting the utility-privacy tradeoff provided by DP mechanisms.
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