Course Allocation with Credits via Stable Matching

May 27, 2025 Β· Declared Dead Β· πŸ› Algorithmic Game Theory

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Authors JosΓ© RodrΓ­guez, David Manlove arXiv ID 2505.21229 Category cs.DS: Data Structures & Algorithms Citations 0 Venue Algorithmic Game Theory Last Checked 5 months ago
Abstract
In the {\sc Course Allocation} problem, there are a set of students and a set of courses at a given university. University courses may have different numbers of credits, typically related to different numbers of learning hours, and there may be other constraints such as courses running concurrently. Our goal is to allocate the students to the courses such that the resulting matching is stable, which means that no student and course(s) have an incentive to break away from the matching and become assigned to one another. We study several definitions of stability and for each we give a mixture of polynomial-time algorithms and hardness results for problems involving verifying the stability of a matching, finding a stable matching or determining that none exists, and finding a maximum size stable matching. We also study variants of the problem with master lists of students, and lower quotas on the number of students allocated to a course, establishing additional complexity results in these settings.
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