Composable security against collective attacks of a modified BB84 QKD protocol with information only in one basis

November 27, 2017 Β· Declared Dead Β· πŸ› Theoretical Computer Science

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Authors Michel Boyer, Rotem Liss, Tal Mor arXiv ID 1711.09716 Category quant-ph: Quantum Computing Cross-listed cs.CR Citations 15 Venue Theoretical Computer Science Last Checked 5 months ago
Abstract
Quantum Cryptography uses the counter-intuitive properties of Quantum Mechanics for performing cryptographic tasks in a secure and reliable way. The Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) protocol BB84 has been proven secure against several important types of attacks: collective attacks and joint attacks. Here we analyze the security of a modified BB84 protocol, for which information is sent only in the z basis while testing is done in both the z and the x bases, against collective attacks. The proof follows the framework of a previous paper (Boyer, Gelles, and Mor, 2009), but it avoids a classical information-theoretical analysis and proves a fully composable security. We show that this modified BB84 protocol is as secure against collective attacks as the original BB84 protocol, and that it requires more bits for testing.
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