On Reachable Assignments in Cycles and Cliques

May 05, 2020 Β· Declared Dead Β· πŸ› arXiv.org

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Authors Luis MΓΌller, Matthias Bentert arXiv ID 2005.02218 Category cs.MA: Multiagent Systems Cross-listed cs.DM, cs.DS Citations 5 Venue arXiv.org Last Checked 2 months ago
Abstract
The efficient and fair distribution of indivisible resources among agents is a common problem in the field of \emph{Multi-Agent-Systems}. We consider a graph-based version of this problem called Reachable Assignments, introduced by Gourves, Lesca, and Wilczynski [AAAI, 2017]. The input for this problem consists of a set of agents, a set of objects, the agent's preferences over the objects, a graph with the agents as vertices and edges encoding which agents can trade resources with each other, and an initial and a target distribution of the objects, where each agent owns exactly one object in each distribution. The question is then whether the target distribution is reachable via a sequence of rational trades. A trade is rational when the two participating agents are neighbors in the graph and both obtain an object they prefer over the object they previously held. We show that Reachable Assignments is NP-hard even when restricting the input graph to be a clique and develop an $O(n^3)$-time algorithm for the case where the input graph is a cycle with $n$ vertices.
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