On the lightweight authenticated semi-quantum key distribution protocol without Trojan horse attack
October 20, 2020 Β· Declared Dead Β· π arXiv.org
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Authors
Jun Gu, Tzonelih Hwang
arXiv ID
2010.10236
Category
quant-ph: Quantum Computing
Cross-listed
cs.CR
Citations
13
Venue
arXiv.org
Last Checked
5 months ago
Abstract
Recently, Tsai et al. (Laser Phys. Lett. 17, 075202, 2020) proposed a lightweight authenticated semi-quantum key distribution protocol for a quantum participant to share a secret key with a classical participant. However, this study points out that an attacker can use a modification attack to make both participants share a wrong key without being detected. To avoid this problem, an improvement is proposed here.
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