Security Proof Against Collective Attacks for an Experimentally Feasible Semiquantum Key Distribution Protocol

December 03, 2020 Β· Declared Dead Β· πŸ› IEEE Transactions on Quantum Engineering

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Authors Walter O. Krawec, Rotem Liss, Tal Mor arXiv ID 2012.02127 Category quant-ph: Quantum Computing Cross-listed cs.CR Citations 7 Venue IEEE Transactions on Quantum Engineering Last Checked 5 months ago
Abstract
Semiquantum key distribution (SQKD) allows two parties (Alice and Bob) to create a shared secret key, even if one of these parties (say, Alice) is classical. However, most SQKD protocols suffer from severe practical security problems when implemented using photons. The recently developed "Mirror protocol" [Boyer, Katz, Liss, and Mor, Phys. Rev. A 96, 062335 (2017)] is an experimentally feasible SQKD protocol overcoming those drawbacks. The Mirror protocol was proven robust (namely, it was proven secure against a limited class of attacks including all noiseless attacks), but its security in case some noise is allowed (natural or due to eavesdropping) has not been proved yet. Here we prove security of the Mirror protocol against a wide class of quantum attacks (the "collective attacks"), and we evaluate the allowed noise threshold and the resulting key rate.
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